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NOTES
Attorneys
NEGLIGENCE OR INCOMPETENCE OF AN AroRNEY
AS GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION.
Introduction
An attorney at law is licensed by the state principally by rea-
son of his unique character as a representative of parties litigant
in courts of justice.' He has been variously described as one who
is "reasonably well acquainted with the law' 2 and an "officer of
the court."3 By provision made as early as the act of 4 HENRY IV.,
c. 18, a system was provided for the appointment of barristers and
counselors at law. Under the modern practice in the United
States, the licensing of attorneys is not regarded as a mere minis-
terial power, but'as a judicial function, and is therefore entrusted
to the courts, rather than to the legislature.4 In the absence of
constitutional or statutory restrictions, a court of superior or
general jurisdiction has the authority to suspend an attorney
from practice, or to disbar or strike from the rolls an attorney of
such court upon proper grounds,5 due to the character of attorn-
eys as officers of the court in which they are admitted to practice.
The ultimate purpose of all regulations of the admission of at-
torneys has been stated as the assurance to the courts of the as-
sistance of advocates of ability, learning and sound character and
the protection of the public from incompetent and dishonest
practitioners.6
Broadly, an attorney may be suspended or disbarred for such
misconduct 9s shows him to be an unfit or unsafe person to
enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the
capacity of a counselor.7 The attorney is a man of three funda-
mental, though not necessarily divided, allegiances. He owes a
duty toward the court of maintaining a "respectful attitude, ....
1 Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 304 (1882).
2 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199 (1879).
3 Danforth v. Egan, 23 S.D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 1024 (1909).
4 In re Day, 181 IlM. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899).
5 State ex rel. Wolfe v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278 (1868).
6 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
7 Wernimont v. State, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S.W. 194 (1911); In re Durant,
80 Conn. 140, 67 Atl. 497 (1907).
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Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculi-
arly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust
criticism and clamor."" Toward his brethren at the bar, the
attorney must "strive at all times to uphold the honor and to
maintain the dignity of the profession."9 Lastly, and most im-
portantly, the attorney is responsible to his client in particular
and society in general - the very raisons d'etre of this unique
representative in the courts of law. To this latter group, a funda-
mental rule has been generally accepted as to the width and
breadth of this responsibility, i.e., that an obligation is owed of
exercising that knowledge, skill and ability ordinarily possessed
and exercised by members of his profession'0 and of possessing
such reasonable knowledge of well-settled rules of law as will
enable him to perform those necessary duties which he may
undertake." The primary purpose of this discussion is to shed
some light upon the application of this principle by the judiciary
in disciplinary actions brought against negligent and incompetent
attorneys.
The Disbarment Proceeding
Behind the institution of the disbarment action are the many
local and state bar associations who have become, in effect, the
"keepers" of the legal profession's conscience. Accordingly,
numerous state statutes have explicitly provided that the errant
counselor shall first be brought before a grievance committee of
the state bar association, which hears testimony and evidence
upon the charges made. 12 If the committee is satisfied that the
lawyer has committed acts which warrant discipline, an action
is then brought before a court having the requisite jurisdiction.
Several statutes have gone so far as to stipulate that the state bar
association has complete jurisdiction over the discipline of its
members, though review is readily available to the judiciary.' 3
Whatever the actual statutory mechanics of the various jur-
8 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs OF m AwER icAN BAR AsSOcIATION,
CANON No. 1 (1954).
9 Id., CANON No. 29 (1954).
10 Hampel-Lawson Mercantile Co. v. Poe, 169 Ark. 840, 277 S.W. 29, 34
(1925).
11 In re Woods, 158 Tenn. 383, 13 S.W2d 800, 803 (1929).
12 ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 32-337 (1939); DEL. CODE ANN., Supreme Court Rules,
32 (1953); s.c. CODE § 56-153-155 (1952); TFx. STAT. PEV. civ. art. 320a-1, State
Bar Act art. 12 B § 16 (1948); wis. STAT. § 256.28 (1951). Typical statutory
provisions wherein the local and state bar associations are designated as the
moving forces behind disbarment proceedings.
13 NEV. cOMP. LAWS § 565 (1929); N.C. CODE § 84-23 (1950).
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isdictions may be, the American Bar Association, through the
CODE OF LEGAL ETmIcs, has had a vital influence upon their
formulation. In several jurisdictions, they have been given the
effect of legislative enactments.Y4 Canon No. 29,15 pertaining to
the maintenance of the honor of the profession, has been re-
peatedly used by the courts as a basis for disbarments for reasons
of incompetence or gross negligence.
Despite the fact that certain state statutes have specifically
enumerated the various grounds for disbarment, the courts have
generally used them merely as minimum standards and have
gone beyond and relied upon common law rules in determining
whether an accused has failed to live up to the requirements of
the bar.16 The problem of ridding the bar and courts of law of
inadequate practitoners has been with the legal profession for
some time. Long ago, it was suggested that trial courts should
be invested with the authority to suspend incompetent attorneys
who had been repeatedly guilty of "sloppy" pleading or other
incompetent practices.' 7 Though this possible solution would seem
particularly drastic and harsh to most, it does point up the fact
that for many years the legal profession in general and the
judiciary in particular have been acutely aware of the havoc
worked upon the integrity and effectiveness of the legal profes-
sion by incompetent attorneys.
Gross Negligence
A fundamental concept which has become enmeshed in nearly
all jurisprudence upon professional disciplinary actions has been
the supposed requisite of "fraud" or some sort of "moral turpi-
tude" on the part of the attorney involved. If the charge of
deliberate or wilful misconduct could not be substantiated, the
cause necessarily failed.' 8 As was stated in In re Smith:1,9 "To
justify disbarment, proof of carelessness or mistaken judgment is
14 DE%. coDE ANN., Supreme Court Rules, Rule 33 (1953); N.c. GFN. STAT.
appendix 6, art. 10 (1943).
35 See Note 9, supra.
16 State v. Mosher, 128 Ia. 82, 103 N.W. 105, 111 (1905).
17 Winch, The Recall of Lawyers, 24 Green Bag 135, 136 (1912). "I am in
favor of the recall of incompetent lawyers.... I certainly favor lodging in
our trial courts authority to suspend a lawyer from practice upon its appear-
ing by the pleadings he files or his conduct at the trial table, that he is
incompetent."
18 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Lotterman, 353 Ill. 399, 187 N.E.
424, 428 (1933).
'9 365 M1l. 11, 5 N.E.2d 227, 229 (1936).
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not sufficient." This theory of moral guilt has predominated,
almost universally, in past disciplinary actions .and has retained
its great significance down to the present time. It would appear,
however, that the trend of recent decisions, while far from dis-
regarding the degree of moral guilt involved, has displayed a
marked lessening of the rigid adherence to this formerly un-
questioned doctrine.
An example of judicial development in this xegard can be
obtained from the opinions expressed by the California courts.
In earlier decisions, the requisite of moral turpitude was thought
indispensable.2 0 Subsequently, the court formulated the theory
that if the oath of office was violated, i.e., "faithfully to discharge
the duties of an attorney . . . to the best of his knowledge and
ability, '2 1 then disciplinary action could and should be imposed
upon the lawyer accused, even though there had been no wilful
misconduct.2 2 Where an attorney was such a careless and in-
different practitioner, the California court held that he had, in
effect, violated his oath of office.23 While fraud was mentioned as
a common law requirement, it did not appear that the acts com-
plained of had been in any way intentional.
After the judicial door had been left ajar, a natural consequence
was the holding that moral turpitude was not an essential in-
gredient in the proceeding but that "gross negligence" which
bordered upon fraud was acceptable in its stead. By interpreting
inadequacy and incompetence as elements of fraud, the courts
have been able to satisfy the statutory as well as common law
requirements. Another convenient evasion has been the finding
of wrong intention from the totality of the attorney's dealings,
even though the acts primarily complained of arose from negligent
practices only.24 While it has been ruled that even inadvertence
may be deemed sufficient to justify a suspension,2 5 the decisions
20 In re Morganstern, 61 Cal. App. 702, 215 Pac. 721 (1923); In re Collins,
147 Cal. 8, 81 Pac. 220 (1905).
21 CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 6067 (1951).
22 Marsli v. State Bar, 210 Cal. 303, 291 Pac. 583, 585 (1930).
23 Cheleden v. State Bar, 20 Cal.2d 133, 124 P.2d 1 (1942).
24 n re Boyer, 231 Ia. 597, 1 N.W.2d 707 (1942) - attorney's continued
negligence not in itself sufficient to warrant disbarment, but taken with
evidence of fraud, it is indicative of his attitude and lack of character;
Disbarred. In re Modr, 268 App. Div. 641, 52 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1st Dept 1945) -
grossly neglected interests of clients and misled them; Disbarred.
23 In re McKenna, 16 Cal.2d 610,'107 P.2d 258 (1940). Attorney prepared
answer to complaint but through inadvertance failed to file it. Plaintiff took
default judgment; Six months suspension.
[Vol. XXX
appear to vary greatly with individual circumstances. Gross
negligence, in and of itself, has been held sufficient as a
basis for disbarment 26 while other actions have been dismissed if
fraudulent intent could not be proved.27
A professional malpractice which has caused considerable
discussion both av to the amount of fraudulent intent involved
and its validity as a basis for disbarment has been the "stringing"
of a client. Under this device, the counselor invariably accepts
his fee in advance, and, while assuring the client that a judg-
ment is forthcoming, he permits the case to hang in abeyance for
months and even years.28 It is difficult to compare this malpractice
with others involving negligence, basically due to the implied
fraud committed in the acceptance of the fee without the per-
formance of services in return.29
In a large number of these "stringing" cases, it would seem that
the original intent, upon the acceptance of the fee, was the
carrying out of the wishes of the client. During the course of the
litigation, however, the human frailty of dilatoriness inevitably
arose to plague the attorney, and lengthy and costly delays in
the prosecution of the client's interests resulted. In the majority
of these cases, a suspension has been considered sufficient, largely
due to the extreme reluctance on the part of the courts to deprive
the errant attorney of his complete professional standing if he has
subsequently made an attempt to repair the injury done. 30
Nevertheless there have been instances of complete disbarment
under similar circumstances.
31
Incompetence
It has been stated, obiter, that an attorney may be stricken
26 In re Gilbert, 274 Ky. 187, 118 S.W2d 535 (1938). Lawyer. neglected
client's cause, accepted fees without rendering services; Disbarred.
27 In re Smith, 365 Ill. 11, 5 NXE2d 227 (1936); In re Janover, 178 App.
Div. 882, 165 N.Y. Supp. 645 (1st Dep't 1917). Negligence, but no fraud or
deceit proved; No disciplinary action.
28 Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal2d 550, 107 P.2d 10 (1940).
29 In re Smith, 84 N.J. Eq. 252, 94 Atl. 39 (Ch. 1915).
30 Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal. 2d 550, 107 P.2d 10 (1940); In -te Chernow,
266 App. Div. 502, 42 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1st Dep't 1943). Attorney neglected the
interests of his client and misled him concerning the status of his case;
Six months suspension.
31 In re Sparer, 265 App. Div. 717, 40 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1st Dep't 1943).
Lawyer failed to prosecute suit, misled client and kept fee; Disbarred; In re
Robinson, 163 App. Div. 844, 147 N.Y. Supp. 103 (1st Dep't 1914). Fees were
accepted over a period of many years of practice for which no services were
ever performed; Disbarred.
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from the rolls of the court at any time by his failure to continue
to meet those requirements that were originally necessary for
admittance to the bar.32 In following this apparent rule, an
interesting question of statutory construction arose where the
issue of ignorance of the law was squarely presented as a basis
for disbarment, and the court said: 33
The result of the authorities is, that for a mere mistake the court
will not punish an attorney, as for that he may be made answerable
in damages upon an action; but for fraudulent and corrupt practice
he may be removed from office.
... ignorance of the law in an attorney does not authorize the
court to suspend or remove him from office, as a contrary doctrine
would render it necessary that an attorney should possess some
knowledge of the law - a condition which the statute does not
require.
While outwardly approving this "rule of thumb", subsequent
decisions have not in any way sustained its validity. Undoubtedly,
a sudden decline in the moral fibre of the attorney or a complete
loss of character will bring dismissal from the bar,3 4 but what of
a subsequent loss of knowledge in the all-important fundamentals
of legal theory and practice?
Incompetence on the part of an attorney in the conduct of his
professional activities has, by statute, been considered grounds
for disbarment in several jurisdictions.35 Though these provisions
would appear to require a certain rigid standard of professional
skill, in practice they necessitate little more than the ordinary
qualification of moral fitness. A number of other jurisdictions
require attorneys to take an oath that they will discharge their
duties to the best of their ability, and authorize proportionate
disciplinary measures for gross neglect in legal practices.
36
Although unhesitatingly recognizing their common law power
to take disciplinary action for negligent and incompetent prac-
tices, the courts have seldom actually exercised this jurisdiction
and the penalties imposed have been relatively light.37 The re-
32 Smith v. State, I Yerg. 228 (Tenn. 1829).
33 Bryant's Case, 24 N.H. (4 Fost.) 149, 155, 158 (1851).
34 Cheleden v. State Bar, 20 Cal.2d 133, 124 P.2d 1 (1942).
35 ALASKA COMP. LAWS AN. § 35-2-71 (10) (1949); WASH. REV. CODE §
2.48.220 (10) (1951).
36 ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 32-101 (1939); CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 6067 (1951);
KAN. GEN. STAT. § 7-105 (1949); Mnm. STAT. § 358.07 (9) (1950); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 5, § 2 (1951).
37 in re Melin, 410 Il. 332, 102 N.E.2d 119 (1951). Attorney was "grossly
negligent" in handling estate funds; Three months suspension; In -re Miller,
55 Nev. 444, 38 P.2d 972 (1934). Lawyer fiegligent and careless in not
closing estate far 20 years; Six months suspension.
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luctance to take away the attorney's professional standing where
there has been no intentional misconduct has been a very signifi-
cant factor. The difficulty of the situation was well-expressed in
Ex parte Burr. 38
On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance
to an individual, and the prosperity of his whole life may depend
on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or
capriciously taken from him. On the other, it is extremely desirable
that the respectability of the bar should be preserved. For these
objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to reside
in the court. This discretion ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment; but it must be exercised; ....
The element of moral guilt again appears as the prime con-
sideration in the underlying theory of the many decisions which
hold that the severe consequences of disciplinary action should
not be imposed upon those who are morally innocent. Character-
istic of this thinking was Friday v. State Bar,3 9 where it was
ruled that in the absence of negligence constituting a violation of
his oath, the attorney's "mere ignorance of the law," in "good
faith" is not cause for disbarment nor could the act committed
because of ignorance constitute moral turpitude. How ignorance
can truly be in "good faith" would appear to be a problem of
no little consequence. Perhaps the court based its decision on the
time-honored "ignorance is bliss" adage.
If the client is protected against the fraud, deceit and gross
negligence of the attorney, it would seem logical that he should
be also sheltered from the complete ignorance or incompetence of
his counselor. Accordingly, it has been stated: "The client is
just as much entitled to protection against carelessness or in-
competence as he is to protection against dishonesty."40 However,
for all practical purposes, it has been impossible to disbar simply
upon the grounds of fundamental ignorance. Though there have
been decisions implying that these grounds should be sufficient,41
other courts have explicitly stated that ignorance of the law can-
not be considered as a possible basis for disbarment.2 Ignorance
of simple statutory provisions which has resulted in a violation
of the law by an attorney has been regarded as so gross as to
38 9 Wheat. 529, 530 (U.S. 1824).
39 23 Cal.2d 501, 144 P.2d 584 (1943).
40 State v. Soderberg, 215 Wis. 571, 255 N.W. 906, 907 (1934).. Attorney
consistently neglected clients, accepted fees for work undone; Two years
probation.
41 Smith v. State, 1 Yerg. 228 (Tenn. 1829).
42 Friday v. State Bar, 23 Cal.2d 501, 144 P.2d 564 (1943).
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involve moral turpitude. "The unprofessional conduct of re-
spondent, which not even the alchemy of extreme charity can
transmute into anything less than gross negligence and sheer
incompetence. . . . reveals a total unfitness to practice law."1
43
Dilatoriness in the prosecution of a client's cause is another
element of incompetence which is often found, express or implied,
in the stated disbarment rulings. Many perplexing problems
caused by the human frailty of procrastination, have arisen in
the efforts of the bar associations and courts in maintaining
professional standards. How punctual, persistent, and persevering
must the lawyer be in the conduct of his client's affairs? Here
again we find that the courts are extremely charitable if the
ingredients of fraud or some kind of moral turpitude cannot be
found.44 Where a dilatory habit has been formed and has become
so fixed and so much a part of the counselor's character as to be
past remedy, disbarment has been ordered. In the case of In re
Gennow,45 the court ruled that a lawyer who persisted in
neglecting his client's affairs for long periods brought the entire
bar into disrepute and displayed an utter "lack of capacity" to
properly serve his clients. It is interesting to note that ineptitude,
coupled with gross negligence formed the basis for the decision,
fraululent intent being all but forgotten. This is characteristic of
a number of decisions in which moral deviation as a necessary
requisite is overshadowed by the fundamental principle in profes-
sional disciplinary theory that the public is entitled to some
protection from practitioners who are grossly inadequate.
"Unethical" and "unprofessional" conduct has been the descrip-
tion applied to acts of negligence and carelessness, as where a
client's foreclosure record was permitted to lapse and become
void by the Statute of Limitations, the court ordering a three
year probation. 6 In many cases involving dilatory conduct,
the courts are quick to utilize such phrases as "unfit" and "un-
professional," yet the subjective intent of the attorney is the
most important consideration and often is the deciding factor
43 In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4, 9 (1946). Counselor advised
and participated in scheme to evade inheritance taxes; Disbarred.
44 In 'e Halpern, 265 App. Div. 340, 38 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1st Dep't 1942).
Client's case was neglected and forgotten, finally dismissed; Six months
suspension.
45 206 Minn. 389, 289 N.W. 887 (1939).
46 In re Larson, 210 Minn. 414, 298 N.W. 707 (1941).
47 In re Marfeo, 274 App. Div. 21, 79 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't 1948).
Attorney failed to act upon client's tort claim for several years, suit was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosectite; Censure.
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between disbarment and suspension or probation for a relatively
short period of time.-7 Nevertheless it has been held that an
attorney is liable in a disciplinary action for the gross negligence
of his secretary which should have been corrected. s
Failure to appear in court to defend the client's case has also
received the harsh condemnation of the courts and has been
considered sufficient to justify dismissal from the bar.49 Inatten-
tion to duty, though insufficient in itself,50 has resulted in
disbarment when considered together with the acceptance of a
fee and a complete lack of services therefor 51
Since the attorney is required to render the best possible service
to his client, it would follow logically that a physical impairment
of his mental facilities would warrant disbarment not only for
the welfare of the particular attorney but for the general public
as well. As was stated supra, earlier cases have suggested that
mental faculties as well as character traits must be maintained
throughout the legal career.52 Though cases of disciplinary action
brought for reasons of insanity or mental disease of some kind
are extremely rare, (due in large measure to the generally-
accepted belief that there must be a degree of guilt) several
holdings have stated that mental or emotional disturbances must
not be allowed to endanger innocent clients.5s That disbarment is
erroneously regarded by some as a criminal proceeding, requiring
a positive proof of moral guilt, is evidenced by the fact that in-
sanity has been pleaded as a defense.5 Only one statutory pro-
48 In re Hendrick, 229 App. Div. 100, 241 N.Y. Supp. 50 (1st Dep't 1930).
Lawyer instructed secretary to secure release from client on an insurance
claim. Anxious to leave on a weekend, the secretary forged the signature.
Though client was subsequently paid, the attorney was held responsible for
not verifying the release; One year suspension.
49 In re Fellows, 57 Ariz. 224, 112 P.2d 864 (1941). Failure to appear at
trial of client on charge of perjury; Disbarred; In re Shelley, 56 Ariz. 303, 107
P.2d 508 (1940). Acceptance of fee for divorce case although nothing was
done to prosecute the action; Disbarred.
50 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Wing, 284 Ill. 647, 120 NE. 451
(1918). Acceptance of client's case with knowledge that it could not be
handled for some time; Insufficient grounds for disbarment.
51 In re Gilbert, 274 Ky. 187, 118 S.W.2d 535 (1938).
52 Smith v. State, 1 Yerg. 228 (Tenn. 1829).
53 In re Manahan, 186 Minn. 98, 242 N.W. 548 (1932). Attorney committed
frauds upon clients while subject to hereditary fits; Disbarred. In re Fitz
Gibbons, 182 Minn. 373, 234 N.W. 637 (1931). Lawyer embezzled funds
which he held as guardian while suffering from periodic epileptiformn
attacks; Disbarred.
54 In re Patlak, 368 111. 547, 15 N.E.2d 309 (1938). Insanity pleaded as a
defense to frauds committed upon clients; Disbarred.
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vision has included "want of a sound mind" as a mandatory basis
for removal from the bar.55
Poverty has figured indirectly in several disbarments through
the resultant negligent and unscrupulous practices which lack of
finances had engendered.56 Youth, inexperience and mental
anguish have not, in themselves, been considered as grounds for
expulsion from the profession but they have been suggested
as mitigating circumstances in determining the severity of dis-
ciplinary actions in which moral or ethical malpractices were
involved.57 Advanced years and senility, insofar as they have
affected the mental capacity of the attorney and his ability to
serve the best interests of his client have resulted in merely
short suspensions, censure or probation.58 In the main, old age,
youth and insanity though affecting the ability of the attorney
to perform his professional duties adequately, have been con-
sidered predominately in mitigating the effect or the severity of
the disciplinary proceeding rather than forming basis for complete
disbarment. Generally, severe reprimands are held sufficient in
cases where old age has resulted in incompetency prejudicial to
the best interests of the client.59
Though inexperience caused by youth or lack of legal practice
has not been taken to justify disbarment, it has also been denied
as a defense to charges of gross negligence in the handling of a
client's funds.60 In other circumstances, however, lack of ex-
perience has been accepted as a mitigating factor.61
55 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-501 (4) (1935).
56 Cheleden v. State Bar, 20 Cal. 2d 133, 124 P.2d 1 (1942). People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Grusd, 318 M. 44, 148 N.E. 860 (1925).
57 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Charone, 288 IM. 220, 123 N.E. 291
(1919). Attorney's inexperience, want of diligence and lack of good judgment
were not considered sufficient grounds for disbarment; No disciplinary
action.
58 In re O'Brian, 197 App. Div. 50, 188 N.Y. Supp. 506 (1st Dep't 1921).
Advanced years and long service considered in mitigation for negligent
practices; One year suspension. In re Tracy, 150 App. Div. 913, 135 N.Y.
Supp. 29 (1912). 71 year old lawyer negligently handled client's funds;
Severe reprimand.
59 In re Tracy, supra, note 58.
60 People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n. v. Waldron, 28 Colo. 249, 64 Pac.
186 (1901).
61 Champagne v. Benoit, 78 Atl. 1009 (R.I. 1911). Lawyer failed to
relinquish money collected for his client due to an exaggerated idea of the
value of his services. His inexperience and want of appreciation of respon-
sibility as an attorney were considered in mitigation of disciplinary meas-
ures; Suspension for several months.
62 JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE LAWYER, A STUDY OF LEGAL
ETHics 1 (1925).
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Conclusion
"A profession is a calling in life based on special training and
ability contemplating public service, and differentiated from
ordinary business vocations by its subordination of pecuniary
returns to efficient service."62 The terms "special training and abil-
ity" and "efficient service" have a vital significance in any intelli-
gent understanding of the problems involved in the maintenance
at a high level of the standards of the legal profession. As has been
often emphasized, 63 and recently reiterated in the 1953 Annual
Reports of the American Bar Association,6 4 the underlying pur-
pose behind the disbarment of an attorney is not the punishment
of the individual, nor is it intended purely to maintain the social
prestige of the profession; rather, it is basically meant to afford
some degree of protection to society and the particular interests
of the client.
If this fundamental premise be established, it appears ex-
tremely difficult to reconcile much of the past and present judicial
thinking in regard to the disciplining of negligent and incompetent
lawyers. Even the word "discipline" is misleading and a source of
continued difficulty since it clearly carries the connotation of
malicious and intentional wrongful acts which require some sort
of retribution. How can the courts regard moral turpitude, fraud
or some sort of intentional misconduct as the only grounds for
disbarment if the fundamental purpose of the proceeding is the
protection of the client? There is little in fact or logic to back
the contention that the careless, disorganized and ill-trained
practitioner is not potentially as harmful as those few un-
scrupulous members of the legal profession. Yet with a very
few exceptions, judicial opinion has steadfastly demanded crimi-
nal requisites for an admittedly non-criminal action.
There is no doubt that the danger exists that undue sanctions
for purely negligent and incompetent practices might result in
the undue harrassment of honest and competent practitioners.
This would appear to be a hazard which has been ever-present
under existing standards and which could be adequately coped
with by the wise exercise of judicial discretion. The courts have
long rdcognized this danger and have taken cognizance -of it.6
One of the principal goals of professional discipline has been
largely undermined by this past and prevailing attitude of a
large number of jurisdictions. In order to adequately serve the
public, the legal profession must afford more effective measures to
combat the grossly negligent and incompetent attorney who un-
63 State v. Soderberg, 215 Wis. 571, 255 N.W. 906 (1934).
64 78 AmNuAL REPORTs or Tm AxanxcAN BAR ASSOCIATiON 298 (1953).
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fortunately can be quite as costly and destructive as his most
unethical brethren. More stringent enforcement of existing statu-
tory and common law professional standards is at present the
most acceptable solution.
James E. Murray
Constitutional Law
REFUSAL TO GIVE INCRIMIIATING EVIDENCE
BEFORE GRAND JURY AS GROUNDS FOR CONTEMPT
Introduction
A fundamental principle incident to the rights of man, which the
framers of our Constitution incorporated therein, is the privilege
against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment.,
This privilege has come under particular scrutiny in our time due
to the prevalence of grand jury investigations. In considering the
problem 6f the refusal to give criminatory evidence before a grand
jury and the possibility of this being contempt, the nature and
scope of the privilege itself must be examined together with its
applicability to grand jury proceedings.
Since the privilege has its basis in the common law maxim, nemo
tenetur seipsum accusare,2 it is evident that such a proposition
may be the subject of many varied interpretations. As a result, re-
fusal to testify before a grand jury by claiming the privilege may
quite unexpectedly result in contempt. The federal and state
courts have recognized this difficulty and have attempted to rem-
edy it by reaching some degree of certainty.
The basic problem we are concerned with is when and how this
privilege can be legally utilized. Decisions in the'state and federal
courts concerning witness immunity before grand juries will be
examined in addition to the presentation of current federal legis-
lation as it affects such testimony. The purpose of this writing,
then, is to examine the decisions and principles as they affect the
privilege and to consider the effect of current legislation on the
matter.
65 Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529 (U.S. 1824).
1 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V which provides ".... nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself... !"
2 (No one is bound to accuse himself.) Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 596 (1896).
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State Interpretation
All jurisdictions within the United States recognize the privi-
lege; most states specifically providing for it in their constitu-
tions.3 However, a distinction does exist between the federal and
state constitutions in that the Fifth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution 4pplies only to the federal courts and in no way in-
volves the states.4 The similarity in the nature and purpose of the
two may well serve as an aid in determining the construction of
either. The precedent inherent in one may also serve as precedent
for the other, thus solidifying their effect to some extent. The duty
to answer will then be fairly uniform since the constitutional right
to assert this privilege against self-incrimination also measures the
duty to answer.5 This applies to the grand jury as well as to other
instrumentalities of our judicial system.6
When a witness appears before a grand jury and answers ques-
tions that may be criminatory in nature, it is necessary, in order
to afford adequate protection against express as well as implied
self-accusation, that the provision in the state constitution be
broadly and liberally construed. The language is brief but com-
prehensive, and so likewise should be its application.7 However,
this should not be carried to extremes since no general immunity
will be granted by a statute or constitution merely because one is
testifying before a grand jury." The refusal is a personal one, in-
capable of being assigned, and is the subject of judicial scrutiny.
The court must realize from the circumstances presented before
the jury, that there is at least an apprehension of the danger of
self-incrimination. In determining the presence of such danger,
the court will give added weight to the oath of the witness as to its
criminatory nature and point out his mistakes before denying his
privilege.9
It may appear at first impression that a witness could appear
before a grand jury, confess all, thereby receiving absolution and
escape contempt. But this is not so, since the "rule is well estab-
lished that confessions and declarations voluntarily made by a
witness before a grand jury may be introduced in evidence in a
subsequent criminal prosecution in which the witness is the de-
3 8 Wiamo , EvmsiEcs § 2252 (3d ed. 1940).
4 Davison v. Guthrie, 186 Iowa 211, 172 N.W. 292 (1919).
5 Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 82 A.2d 773, 780 (1951).
6 Commonwealth v. McNary, 246 Mass. 46, 140 NYE. 255, 256 (1923).
7 People v. Newmark, 312 IM. 625, 144 N. 338, 340 (1924).
8 Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Ala. 91, 12 So.2d 314, 317 (1943).
9 In re Jennings, 154 Ore. 482, 59 P.2d 702, 718 (1936).
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fendant."'10 The grand jury witness need not be informed of his
constitutional privilege and if he testifies without objection, then
he will be regarded as having done so voluntarily and hence
waived his privilege to refuse.:" In reaching this conclusion, it is
presumed that the witness knew the law to the effect that he could
not be compelled to give such testimony, since everyone is pre-
sumed to know the law. But once he does begin to testify, and then
subsequently claims his privilege, the problem arises as to how
far the courts may go in determining whether the claim is made in
good faith.-2 If the court does recognize it as a bona fide claim,
then the privilege applies, not only to the cause under considera-
tion, but to any and all facts the jury may discover or develop
therefrom. Hence, if the answer to a series of questions would tend
to incriminate, while an answer to one would not, the witness may
not be compelled to answer.'3 And once the immunity has been
unjustly claimed, the witness will not be held in contempt each
time he refuses to testify on the same or closely related matters,
but he will be deemed guilty of only one contempt and punished
accordingly. 14
The privilege, as can readily be seen, applies to testimony be-
fore a grand jury,15 and in fact an unjustifiable refusal to answer
a proper question proposed by a grand jury is grounds for con-
tempt. It is the unjustifiable refusal that provides the grounds,
thus eliminating mistake as furnishing such grounds, and imply-
ing that the court must first determine the adequacy of the privi-
lege claimed.' 6 In the case of Gendron v. Burnham,17 the court
was concerned with the power to punish for contempt and the
problem of maintaining an equitable balance between the right of
the court to require answers and the right of the witness to refuse.
Here, there was no evidence that the witness was obstructive, and
as such, he was entitled to specific rulings by the court as to
whether or not the privilege was validly claimed for the questions
he had refused to answer. This power to punish for contempt is
inherent in the court and it can utilize such power to prevent the
10 2 WHARTON's CRrimAL EvIDENCE 971 (11th ed. 1935).
11 State v. Comer, 157 Ind. 611, 62 N.E. 452, 453 (1902); cf. People v.
Larue, 28 Cal. App.2d 748, 83 P.2d 725, 728 (1938).
12 People v. Richter, 182 Misc. 96, 43 N.Y.S.2d 114, 124 (1943).
3 People v. Newmark, 312 M. 625, 144 N.E. 338, 341-342 (1924).
14 People ex rel. Amarante v. McDonnell, 100 N.Y.S.2d 463, 467 (Sup.
Ct. 1950).
35 People v. McPhail, 118 Colo. 478, 197 P.2d 315, 317 (1948); State v.
Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 9 A.2d 63, 69 (1939).
16 Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 82 A.2d 773, 781 (1951).
17 Id., 82 A.2d at 773.
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hindrance or obstruction of the administration of justice.' 8 The
grand jury, being a judicial body, is a constituent part of the
court'19 and contempt of it is contempt of the court.20 In Common-
wealth v. McNary, 21 the court reiterated this fundamental propo-
sition and expounded further on the matter when it stated that: 
22
... the court has the power and is charged with the duty of
punishing for contempt any one whose conduct interferes with
or has a tendency to obstruct the grand jury. Such conduct is
as much contempt, and punishable as such, as that which
interferes with or has a tendency to obstruct the administration
of justice in the courts in another form or manner.
Before a grand jury, as before a court, the command must be clear
and the disobedience willful for the authority of the court to have
been abused.23 If, however, a witness answers a question on a
promise of immunity, he will not be considered as abusing the
court if he refuses, provided he has grounds for asserting the privi-
lege. Nor will his testimony criminate him if he testified in reliance
on the promise.24
This is the view in the state courts concerning the privilege
against self-incrimination, its application to grand jury proceed-
ings and the abuse of it amounting to contempt. We have consid-
ered this privilege as it applies to a refusal to testify before a grand
jury, and have found that an unjust and unfounded refusal may
draw from that jury a contempt citation. These decisions present
a point of departure from which the statutes governing particular
situations must necessarily proceed in their construction and in-
terpretation.
Federal Interpretation
Having discussed somewhat at length the nature and theory of
the state courts concerning the privilege before a grand jury, at-
tention is now turned to its counterpart, the federal courts and
grand juries. In Twining v. New Jersey,2 the Supreme Court was
called upon to consider the question of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment prevented the states from encroaching on the privi-
38 Winfree v. State, 175 Tenn. 427, 135 S.W.2d 454, 455 (1940).
19 People v. Pisanti, 179 Misc. 308, 38 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (County Ct. 1943).
20 Ex parte Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 292 Pac. 481, 493 (1930).
21 246 Mass. 46, 140 N.E. 255 (1923).
22 Id., 140 N.E. at 256.
23 Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. 251, 22 NE.2d 360, 365 (1939).
24 People v. Conzo, 301 111. App. 524, 23 N.E2d 210, 213 (1939).
25 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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lege against self-incrimination. After analyzing this concept in the
light of both the "privileges and immunities" clause and
the due process clause, the Court concluded that "exemp-
tion from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the
States is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitu-
tion." 26 The Court further stated that even if it be assumed that
the right is one fundamental to the nature of man under a free
government, it is, so far as the states are concerned, one which
must be safeguarded by the states themselves. 27 The Fifth
Amendment may then be said to operate exclusively in the re-
striction of federal power and has no application, as such, to the
states.28 For these reasons, immunity against state prosecution is
not essential to the validity of a federal statute which provides
that testimony of the witness will not be used against him, nor is
it essential to the validity of a state statute where immunity is not
guaranteed against federal prosecution. In this way, investiga-
tions for federal and state purposes will not be hampered because
the privilege guaranteed by one of their respective statutes is not
co-extensive with that of the other.29
The Fifth Amendment is susceptible of two main interpreta-
tions when considering testimony given before federal grand
juries. It may be construed liberally, allowing the witness to decide
for himself what he is to answer. Under this approach, no one
could be compelled to testify unless he so chose, which choice in
itself defeats the purpose of the privilege, or unless he evidenced
bad faith in refusing. Or, if his testimony is to be a complete par-
don for all he has testified to, then he has secured absolute im-
munity. This indeed satisfies the purpose of the Amendment, since
he will not be a witness against himself although compelled to
testify. In addition to this, the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Walker3" reiterates the principle that if the witness elects to waive
the privilege before a grand jury, then he must continue making
full disclosures, for then he is not allowed to stop. In so doing, a
tendency to disgrace or embarrass the witness himself or others,
before the grand jury or elsewhere, is not grounds for refusal.31
26 Id., at 114.
27 Id., at 91-97. But only five of the thirteen colonies (North Carolina,
1776; Pennsylvania, 1776; Virginia, 1776; Massachusetts, 1780; New Hamp-
shire,. 1784) insisted on safeguarding this privilege which is evidence that
it was not originally considered among the inalienable rights of our "found-
ing fathers."
28 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833).
29 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931).
30 161 U.S. 591 (1896); accord, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367
(1951).
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These are grounds only when it exposes the witness himself to
prosecution, and even there, when that possibility is removed, the
Amendment ceases to apply.3 2
In the case, United States v. Burr, 33 Chief Justice Marshall,
in recognizing the maxim that no man is bound to criminate him-
self, sets forth the well known "link test" for determining the
courts' power to ask questions and the rights of the witness to re-
fuse to answer. In upholding this right of refusal before a grand
jury, he said that: 3 4
It is the province of the court to judge whether any direct
answer to the question which may be proposed will furnish
evidence against the witness. If such answer may disclose a fact
which forms a necessary and essential link in the chain of testimony,
which would be sufficient to convict him of any crime, he is not
bound to answer it so as to furnish matter for that conviction.
The opinion of the witness himself, in claiming the immunity be-
fore the jury, does not of itself "establish the hazard of the incrim-
ination."3 5 Of course it is to be understood that the witness need
not prove that the answer would actually be criminatory since in
doing this he would be losing the privilege while trying to estab-
lish it. It is enough if the danger is real and not merely fanciful. 36
The court will recognize the danger and release the witness from
the obligation to answer where it appears that it is absolutely
necessary. In this way, abuse of the privilege will be kept at a
minimum.
It is a settled principle that the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment extends to federal grand juries.37 Since they are a part of
the court, contempt of the grand jury in its presence, is contempt
in the presence of the court and will be punished accordingly.38
A witness cannot challenge the authority of the grand jury nor is
he entitled to set limits on the scope of its investigation. Since a
33 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595 (1896).
32 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
33 25 Fed. Cas. 38, No. 14,692e (D.Va. 1807).
34 Id., at 40; Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
35 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
36 United States v. Greenberg, 187 F.2d 35, 38 (3d Cir. 1951); Aff'd, 192
F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1951); cert. granted 342 U.S. 917 (1952); rev'd per curiam
343 U.S. 918 (1952). This case was reversed by the Supreme Court on the
basis of the Hoffman case, supra. Reversal was decided on the basis of the
similarity in the application of the privilege and not on a material point of
law.
37 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (3d ed. 1940).
38 Camarota v. United States, 111 F.2d 243, 246 (3d Cir. 1940); Cert.
denied sub nom Camarato v. United States, 311 US. 651 (1940).
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grand jury is a part of the court, contempt of it can be punished
the same as that before a court. It is specifically provided by
statute that: 39
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine
or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority,
and none other, as- (1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence
or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; ...
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree, or command.
Thus a grand jury being a part of the court has power to punish for
contempt of its order or command. Whether or not the refusal to
answer on grounds of self-incrimination is contempt of the grand
jury, depends on the surrounding circumstances. Since the privi-
lege controls the duty to answer, an abuse of the privilege is an
abuse of the duty to answer. Such abuse may result in contempt.
Thus it appears that any unjust claim of the privilege which ap-
pears so in the eyes of the court, may be contempt, while a refusal
to answer when under a command to do so by the court would be
an outright contempt.
The inquisitorial functions of the grand jury and the compul-
sion of witnesses to answer are indirectly recognized as inherent
parts of our judicial process.40 In Counselman v. Hitchcock,4 1 the
Supreme Court, seeing a similarity of principle and spirit between
the state and federal constitutions, advocates a liberal construc-
tion in order to effect, as far as possible, the same interpretation.
However, the Court stated that: 2
We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party
or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating
question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege
conferred by the Constitution of the United States.
In the Counselman case, the witness refused to answer before the
jury; he was then taken into the court and instructed to answer,
but on his return he refused again. The Supreme Court upheld
his refusal because the act under which the inquiry was being
made was declared unconstitutional. The Court did prevent the
use of the evidence against the witness but did not preclude prose-
cution. Nothing short of absolute immunity would justify com-
pelling the witness to testify if he claimed his privilege.
There is a clear distinction between amnesty and the constitu-
39 62 STAT. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1952).
40 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280 (1919).
41 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
42 Id., at 586.
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tional protection against self-incrimination,4 3 for if there was
none, then the Fifth Amendment would bathe all in immunity.
A witness before a grand jury can claim the privilege for a valid
reason. The necessity of a valid reason is the distinction. However,
a statute may grant absolute immunity in order to obtain informa-
tion not otherwise available. As far as the applicability of the
Amendment where the nature of the proceeding is concerned, Jus-
tice Brandeis in McCarthy v. Arndstein,44 states that: "It applies
alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer
might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it."
Included in this is the grand jury and the witnesses who may ap-
pear before it.
In determining the nature and scope of the constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. White,45 said that the difficulties that may be experienced
in the detection and prosecution of crime, as a result of acknowl-
edging the privilege, would be far outweighed by the potential
evils of self-incrimination. Even complete immunity may be grant-
ed by Congress in the pursuit of the constitutional powers when
the public interest will be better served by the information ob-
tained, than by the punishment of the witness for the crime re-
vealed.46 This indeed would greatly increase the effectiveness of
the grand jury. However, legislation which is plain in its terms,
and appears on its face, to the layman, to grant complete immunity,
will be upheld in order to give effect to the intent of the legislature,
as evidenced by the words of the act.4 7
It is plain to see from these decisions that the federal courts
are more liberal in the granting of witness immunity than the
state courts. However, this may be due to the closer cooperation
between legislative and judicial departments in the federal
government, and their reluctance to infringe on one another.
Since the grand jury is usually effectuating the desires of the
legislature indirectly, it provides the link between the information
desired and the privilege granted by the legislature. Thus the
judiciary breaches the gap between punishment and privilege.
Federal Legislation
In addition to the immunity granted by the Fifth Amendment
43 Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913).
44 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
45 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
46 United States v. Jaffe, 98 F. Supp. 191, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
47 United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 430 (1943).
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to a witness before a federal grand jury, Congress has it within
its power to compel testimony in any proceeding and, at the same
time, remove the criminatory nature of it, if there is any. In other
words, Congress may confer a blanket immunity in congressional
proceedings as well as before a grand jury. This power to make
all laws necessary to its functioning is explicitly conferred on Con-
gress by the Constitution. 48 Further enforcing this power, the Con-
stitution, in the Fourteenth Amendment, 49 also prevents the states
from interfering with this exclusive power of the legislature. In
considering federal legislation on the matter, it can be seen that
the power to grant immunity is a tremendous responsibility and
one that is not easily handled. It was first specifically granted in
1857, and since then, it has been changed many times in an at-
tempt to avoid abuse while at the same time furthering the inves-
tigative capabilities of Congress.5" Initially, under these statutes,
the federal grand jury was not mentioned, and as such, it may be
assumed that the intent was merely to advance congressional in-
vestigations. In 1948, Congress attempted to clarify all ambiguity
by passing a statute conferring immunity from prosecution for
testimony given before Congress. This statute reads: 51
No testimony given by a witness before either House, or before
any committee of either House, or before any joint committee
established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses
of Congress, shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding
against him in any court, except in a prosecution for perjury
committed in giving such testimony. But an official paper or record
produced by him is not within the said privilege.
The grand jury proceedings are not afforded this opportunity
since the statute only pertains to Congressional investigations.
As stated in United States v. Bryan,52 the purpose of this "bar-
gain" statute was to give a complete immunity in subsequent
criminal proceedings in return for which the Committee could
compel testimony of a criminatory nature. The only way Con-
gress can compel such testimony and still not abrogate the rights
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is to remove its self-incrimi-
natory nature. This is exactly what Congress did by this statute.
48 U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8: "The Congress shall have Power ... To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers . . ."
49 U.S. CONST. AIMEND. XIV, § 1: ... No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States. .. ."
50 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 335 (1950).
51 62 STAT. 833 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1952).
52 339 U.S. 323, 337-339 (1950).
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The Supreme Court, in Adams v. Maryland, 53 said the act was
a bar to self-incrimination in state courts and under state statutes
as well. Thus on the federal level, the immunity was made co-
extensive, giving protection in both federal and state courts.
Because of the continued use of the privilege as a protective
shield by criminals and subversives, 54 Congress decided to ex-
tend this immunity to grand juries and other proceedings, while
at the same time establishing certain conditions precedent to its
availability. These conditions narrowed the scope of the statute
to the most important areas. This recent amendment of the "bar-
gain" statute, entitled "Compelled testimony tending to incrimi-
nate witnesses; immunity",55 provides that in any investigation
concerning national security, by following the proper procedure a
witness can be compelled to testify but he cannot be prosecuted as
a result of such testimony. As a safeguard against possible abuse,
immunity will not be granted unless the Attorney General has
been informed and a petition has been filed with the United States
district court, requesting that such immunity be granted. Here,
the court will make the direct order to compel testimony by nul-
lifying the refusal, and will enter such command as a matter of
record. Before Congress or Committees thereof, a majority of
those present must consent to the compulsion of the testimony.
Once the witness has been compelled to answer, and then refuses,
he will be punished for contempt because then the basis for the
refusal to testify is gone.
Complete immunity, although restricted to items concerning
national security, is now available to witnesses before federal
grand juries. There is no question as to the nature of his answer
since there is no prosecution to fear on the federal or state level.
He must answer all questions when ordered to do so since a re-
fusal now amounts to open contempt.
Conclusion
It is evident from our consideration of this matter that what is
or is not contempt for a refusal to testify, depends a great deal on
the surrounding circumstances in each case. This survey has only
considered cases dealing with the privilege before a grand jury,
and the abuse that results in contempt. It has been found that a
just refusal to testify, on the part of the witness because of possi,
ble self-incrimination, will always be recognized by the courts,
53 347 U.S. 179, 181-182 (1954).
54 H.R. RP. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
55 Pub. L. No. 600, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., Chap. 769 (Aug. 20, 1954).
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and this privilege to refuse, without contempt, will be allowed if
actually needed. In presenting the privilege and attempting to de-
fine its limits as it applies before a grand jury, this article has
merely shown the many facets of the privilege. An abuse of any
one may result in a contempt citation. Such contempt is punishable
both by the federal and state courts, but greater liberality will be
found under the federal system, since here the federal judiciary
is guarding a very fundamental guarantee of the Constitution.
Many statutes have been enacted in the various states, confltm-
ing the common law right to refuse to testify while at the same
time enlarging it to cover general areas or confining it to particular
fields for particular purposes. In any event, the basic purpose of
these enactments has been to remove the refusal and the crimi-
natory nature while at the same time compelling testimony under
the threat of contempt. Such statutes afford maximum security
for the witness, while at the same time outlining his duty to answer
so as to let him make the choice between complying with the order
or being held in contempt for the refusal. Here, there is no chance
of infringing on the rights of the witness because there can be no
self-incrimination and the possibility of contempt is not hidden
behind the vague generalities used by the courts when they at-
tempt to clarify exactly what is an abuse of the privilege to refuse
to testify. The main purpose of these statutes has been to aid in
the functioning of the grand jury and to facilitate the attainment
of its goal as an inquisitorial instrumentality of the judiciary.
From the practical point of view, the principles set forth in this
writing form the foundation for the right of a witness before a
grand jury to refuse to answer on the grounds of self-incrimina-
tion. Any abuse of that right constitutes contempt. These princi-
ples may be used in deciding whether a particular answer may be
refused because of possible self-incrimination. As can be seen
from this writing, there is no definite answer to the problem, with
the possible exception of a generalization that contempt depends
on the reasonableness of the refusal. In granting immunity, statu-
tory enactments are of necessity quite comprehensive in their
effect. The Supreme Court quite clearly stated this necessity in
holding that: 56 "In view of the constitutional provision, a statu-
tory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against
future prosecution.... ." This is exactly the effect of the latest fed-
eral statute in certain situations, where absolute immunity is
granted thereby assuring validity. No longer will the privilege
against self-incrimination be used as a shield when the protection
of this statute is invoked. But nevertheless the statute should be
56 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
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closely guarded to prevent it from becoming an immunity bath for
all the subversives and undesireables in the nation. It is hoped
that with this blanket immunity, grand jury and congressional
investigations will be better able to obtain the information desired
and, at the same time, add to the equitable administration of
justice.
Edmund L. White
Torts
STATUTORY IMPOSITION OF VicAaxous LIABILTY UPON PARENTS
FOR CiILD's TORTs
Traditionally common law jurisprudence has embraced two
basic principles. First of these is the maxim that one wrong-
fully injured has a remedy. Second, there is the familiar prin-
ciple of no liability without fault. The field of tort law occa-
sionally brings these maxims- into conflict as where a minor
is guilty of a tort and the plaintiff seeks to hold the parent liable.
A wronged plaintiff has his action against the child for damages
but there is little chance of satisfaction. Hence, it is common
practice to attempt to hold the parent vicariously liable. But
courts are notoriously reluctant to impose liability upon a parent
where there is no fault, and the mere fact of a parent-child re-
lationship has never been, at common law, a basis for parental
liability.
In recent years, this problem has received the attention of the
state legislatures. Finding that common law inroads upon parental
immunity do not satisfy modern needs, there have been several
types of statutes enacted to impose liability upon the parent. Be-
fore considering these statutes, however, a cursory glance at the
nature of common law liability is advisable.
Common Law Liability
Parental liability for a child's tort at common law was imposed
in two situations, i. e., where there was an agency relationship,
or where the parent was himself guilty in the commission of the
tort in some way. A New York decision' divided the liability pos-
sibilities into five specific situations. First, where the doctrine of
respondeat superior was applicable; second, where the parent
I Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 293 N.Y. Supp. 147 (2d
Dep't 1937).
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entrusted a dangerous instrumentality to the care of a child;
third, where the parent entrusted an instrumentality to the care
of a child knowing the child capable of inflicting injury with it;
fourth, where the parent had knowledge of the child's dangerous
propensities but failed to take corrective steps; and fifth, where
the parent participated with the child by consenting to, or ratify-
ing the tortious act. The last four categories are merely par-
ticularizations of the general proposition that a parent will be
liable for his child's tort when the parent is himself in some way
guilty, the second, third and fourth being predicated on the
negligence of the parent.
Under the agency theory, the parent has been liable for inten-
tional torts when the act was at the direction of the parent,
either expressed or implied.2 This agency theory is modified by
application of the rule that a principal is not liable for an agent's
tort committed when the agent "strays" from the principal's
business.3 The "family purpose" or the "family car" doctrine is an
off-spring of this agency theory. This doctrine equates the family
car with the father's business and the child to the father's agent.4
When the parent is held liable for his child's tort on the theory
that the parent was himself negligent, liability lies for the parent's
negligence and not for the act of the child.5 In this connection it
should be noted that there is a narrow line between a parent's
liability for entrusting a dangerous instrument to a child, and the
liability bottomed upon a parent's knowledge of his child's
vicious habits. One case held that an air gun was not a dangerous
instrument and the father's liability, if any, had to rest on his
knowledge of his son's vicious nature.6 Another case held that
plaintiff's failure to allege that an air rifle was a dangerous instru-
ment, or that use of it when given to a child would result in harm
to others, was demurrable.7 That the courts are reluctant to im-
pose vicarious liability on parents is evident in Skelton v. Gain-
breli,8 where the child shot and killed plaintiff's spouse with a
gun given to him by his parents. The parents had notice that the
son had on several occasions pointed the gun at other people, but
this was held not sufficient to establish notice that the child would
2 Trahan v. Smith, 239 S.W. 345 (Tex. App. 1922).
* Kirkpatrick v. McCarty, 112 Colo. 588, 152 P.2d 994 (1944).
4 Grier v. Woodside, 200 N.C. 759, 158 S.E. 491 (1931); acord, Gosset
v. Van Egmond, 176 Ore. 134, 155 P.2d 304 (1945).
5 Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929).
6 Capps v. Carpenter, 129 Kan. 462, 283 Pac. 655 (1930).
7 Mazzocchi v. Seay, 126 W.Va. 490, 29 S.E.2d 12 (1944).
8 80 Ga. App. 880, 57 S.E.2d 694 (1950).
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commit manslaughter.
It becomes obvious that these two theories imposing vicarious
liability upon parents do not comprehend all possible torts. There-
fore, the legislatures in a number of jurisdictions have felt the
necessity of covering certain aspects of the parent-child relation-
ship with statutes making the parent liable for the child's tort.
Statutory Liability
The liability of parents for the torts of their children has been
imposed in various types of statutes, some declaratory of the
common law and others in derogation of the common law. The
former type, because they declare common law principles, do not
impose liability on a parent-child relationship per se. That the
parent is made liable is merely incidental to the operation of the
statute. mustrative of this class is a Montana statute making
children liable for their civil wrongs; 9 a North Carolina statute
imposing liability as a misdemeanor for giving a child under
twelve years of age firearms;' 0 and statutes of several states that
apply the agency theory in the form of the "family purpose"
doctrine or requiring, simply, proof of an agency relationship."3
Probably the most interesting statute announcing common law
doctrine in this field is the Georgia statute that reads:
Every person shall be liable for torts committed by . . . his
child ... by his [the parent's) command or in the prosecution and
within the scope of his business, whether the same shall be by
negligence or voluntary.12
This act incorporates the agency theory upon which the common
law imposed a child's liability upon his parents.' 3 The underlying
principle is agency, however, not the parent-child relationship.
Statutes imposing liability on parents for the torts of their
children move closer to the imposition of liability grounded upon
the parental status. Of these, the most frequently found concern
the negligence of a minor in driving an automobile. In fourteen
states, the person who signs the minor's application for a driver's
license is made liable for the negligence of the minor while
driving.'- The most comprehensive of these statutes provides that
9 moNT. mV, CODES AN. §64-113 (1947); see also, oimA. STAT. tit. 10, §20(1951).
30 I.C. GEN. sTAT. §14-316 (Recomp. 1953).
3" CONN. GEN. STAT. §§7904, 7905 (1949); MnM. STAT. ANNOTATIONS §170.54
(1949); x.C. GEN. STAT. §20-71.1 (Recomp. 1953).
i2 GA. CODE ANN. §105-108 (1937).
13 Supra, page 296.
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the parent, guardian, or anyone signing the application will have
the minor's negligence, ordinary or "wilful", imputed to him and
will be jointly and severally liable with the minor!' 5 The signer
can extinguish his liability by requesting cancellation of the
minor's license or by having the minor file and maintain proof
of financial responsibility. Death of the signer will also cause
cancellation of the license.1 6
In practical effect, this type of statute results in liability being
placed most often upon parents, who are the most frequent signers
for the minor.'7 But the traditional reluctance of the common law
to impose liability upon a parent because of the status as a
parent is evident from the attitude of the courts to the statutes.
In Bispham v. Mahoney,'8 an action under the Delaware act, the
court said: '9
The legislative intention as disclosed by the language of the
statute is not to impose liability by reason of parenthood, of itself.
Custody of the minor is the foundation of liability. The legislative
purpose was to protect the public, and the statutes were drawn to
effect the purpose in the most practical way.
The court went on to stress the voluntary assumption of
liability by the parent so that liability was imposed because of the
consent of the signer.
It is evident, then, that while the law has not yet imposed
liability upon a parent for his child's tort, the practical effect of
these statutes is that the parent signer is held liable for the
minor's negligence. When compared to the common law approach
of the "family purpose" doctrine,20 however, these statutes are
one step closer to imputing the negligence of the child to the
parent on the sole basis of the relationship. Under the statute,
no agency need be proven to hold the signer liable. All that is
necessary ig to show a prior signing by the parent coupled with
negligence on the part of the child.
2
'
In a limited number of jurisdictions, there are statutes which
do impose liability upon parents for the torts of their children,
the parental status being the sole bases for imposing this
34 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Utah.
'5 CAL. VEH. CODE ANN. §350 et seq. (1948).
16 AR. STAT. AN. §75-317 (1947); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§49-313, 49-315 (1949).
"7 See annotation of these cases in 26 A.L.R.2d 1320.
's 7 Harr. 285, 183 Ati. 315 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1936).
'9 Id. at 315.
20 Supra, page 296.
21 Pascoe v. Payne, 124 Cal. App. 528, 12 P.2d 1091 (1932).
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liability. All of these statutes are concerned, in varying degree,
with property destruction caused by the child. The earliest
statute of this kind was enacted in Arkansas in 1849.22 This act
makes a parent liable for a fine imposed by the act when the
child destroys property of another. The succeeding section of
the law provides that the imposition of the fine shall not acquit
anyone from civil liability. 3 Unfortunately, there are no reported
decisions construing this act and it is not clear whether or not
the parent would be civilly liable.21 Under a strict construction
approach, the parent would probably escape liability in a civil
action.
In Arizona,23 Maine,26 New Jersey,27 and Oregon,23 there are
statutes which impose liability upon a parent where the child
harms or injures school property. Missouri imposes a ten dollar
fine when a child defaces the state house, to be collected in a civil
action from the parent.2 9 There are no reported decisions con-
struing these statutes, probably 'because of their limited applica-
tion.3 0
By far the most important statutes of this character have been
only recently enacted, in Nebraska in 1951,31 and in Michigan in
1953.32 The Nebraska law reads:
The parents shall be jointly and severally liable for the wilfull
and intentional destruction of real and personal property occasioned
by their minor or unemancipated children residing with them, or
placed by them under the care of other persons.
The Michigan statute is essentially the same except that liability
is limited to three hundred dollars.
These two enactments, along with those concerning school
22 Am STAT. ANN. §41-4233 (1947).
23 Id. §41-4234.
:24 All of the states having statutes imposing liability upon parents of a
child destroying property of another show an absence of decisions constru-
ing those statutes. Some of the more important have been so recently
enacted that there has been scarcely enough time for a decision. Those
which have been in existence longer are so limited in scope, that it is
probable that no appeal has been taken on them.
25 ARIZ. CODE ANN. §54-504 (1939).
26 mE. REv. STAT., c. 37, §193 (1944).
27 NT. STAT. A x. §18:14-51 (1940).
28 ORE. REv. STAT. §336.170 (1953).
29 310. ANN. STAT. §§10279, 10280 (Vernon 1939).
30 Supra, note 24.
31 NEB. REv. STAT. §43-801 (Supp. 1952).
32 vIc. STAT. ANN. §271408(1) (Cum. Supp. 1953).
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property, impose liability upon the parent-child relationship in
the true sense of the concept. No agency is required to be shown,
nor does an aggrieved plaintiff have to show that the parent was
in some way negligent or responsible for failing to prevent the
destruction of property as at common law. It might be said that
liability lies on the parent for his failure to enlighten his charge
on the unlawful nature of destroying property, but this basis of
liability goes to the core of the domestic training of children and
is far different from the common law theories. The object of the
statutes is the protection of a third party's property. To grant
this protection, the legislatures have incidentally at least looked
to the parent's duty to train and discipline his child. It is clearly
evident that the statutes in question have added an element to
our legal system which the common law has steadily refused to
recognize.
A parallel doctrine of parental liability is well entrenched in
the civil law prevailing in Louisiana.33 The civil law liability
upon the parent covers all tortious acts of the child, intentional
or negligent, and is predicated on the parent-child relationship.3 4
Though the Nebraska and Michigan laws apply only to the wilful
destruction of another's property and are relegated to a much
narrower scope, the basic theory behind the statutes, i.e., liability
because of parental status, is the same basis on which the civil
law has imposed liability upon a parent for the child's tort. Once
the prohibited act has been established as having been perpe-
trated by the child, the parent is liable regardless of whether or
not he has taken any part in its commission.
Those statutes imposing liability upon a parent when the child
has destroyed property take the final step in imposing absolute
parental liability and are the logical end result of the trend
found in the liability of a signer of the minor's application for a
driver's license.35 In the license statutes, the parent's liability
is voluntarily assumed by signing the license. Also, the scope of
the license acts is not limited to parents but extends to anyone
33 The father, or after his decease, the mother, are responsible for the
damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children, residing with
them, or placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them
recourse against those persons. LA. CIV. CODE, art. 2318 (1952); history, Projet
du Gouvernement (1800), Bk. III, Title III, Art. 20, par2.
34 Honeycutt v. Cower, 25 So.2d 99, 101 (La. 1946): "A father is liable
for the act of a minor son residing with him.... This liability is based on
the acts of the minor which constitute fault or negligence .... It is not
necessary to show that the minor son was on a mission for his parent, as
the liability is not based on the relationship of master and servant."
35 Supra, page 298.
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